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I.

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu

Center) is a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of
Law that works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and
education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing the legacy of
Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders during World War II that
ultimately led to the incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans. He
took his challenge to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld his
conviction in 1944 on the ground that the removal of Japanese Americans
was justified by "military necessity." Fred Korematsu went on to
successfully vacate his conviction and to champion the cause of civil
liberties and civil rights for all people. The Korematsu Center, inspired by
his example, works to advance his legacy by promoting social justice for
all. It has a special interest in promoting fairness in the courts of our
country. That interest includes ensuring that presumptions based on
national origin, ethnicity, and culture not be used to justify unfair
restrictions on important family relationships and activities incident to
those family relationships. The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University.
The Asian Bar Association of Washington (ABAW) 1s the
professional association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law
1

professors, and law students that strives to be a network for its members in
Washington State. Created in 1987, ABAW advocates for the legal needs
and interests of the AP A community and represents over 200 AP A
attorneys in a wide range of practice areas. It is a local affiliate of the
National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA). Through
its network of committees, ABAW monitors legislative developments and
judicial appointments, rates judicial candidates, advocates for equal
opportunity, and builds coalitions with other organizations within the legal
profession and in the community at large. ABAW also addresses crises
faced by its members and the broader Asian and Pacific Islander
community in Washington. The founders created ABAW precisely to
address issues like the ones presented in this appeal. Further, ABAW's
interest in this specific matter dates back to 2005 when ABAW submitted
Memorandum of Amici Asian Bar Association of Washington and
Vietnamese American Bar Association of Washington in Support of
Appellant's Motion for Review in In re Marriage of Katare (Supreme
Court No. 76691-6 (Court of Appeals No. 52331-6-I)) ("Memorandum of
Amici").
The Vietnamese American Bar Association of Washington
(VABAW) is a professional association of attorneys, law professors,
judges, and law students involved in issues impacting the Vietnamese
2

American community in Washington State. Formed in 2005, its objectives
are to provide mutual support for attorneys in the advancement of their
careers, to be a trusted guide and resource for students who aspire towards
the legal profession, to serve as a voice for the local Vietnamese American
community, and to represent Vietnamese American attorneys within the
State Bar. VABAW shares ABAW's interests and participates in similar
activities with respect to VABAW's particular constituency. It, too, has a
special interest in pursuing the goals of equal opportunity and access to
justice. V ABAW has a strong interest in issues surrounding the treatment
of immigrants in all areas of the legal system, including in family law.
Further, VABAW's interest in this specific matter dates back to 2005
when V ABAW joined with ABAW in submitting Memorandum of Amici
in this matter.
A motion requesting leave to file this brief, along with a motion for a
two-day extension for filing, was submitted on April23, 2010.

II.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici curiae urge that this Court reverse the trial court's order

restricting Brajesh Katare's two children from international travel with
Mr. Katare until they are adults and requiring him to relinquish his
passport when he has custody of the children because the order was based
on improperly admitted expert testimony and other evidence that relied on
3

stereotypes, inaccurate characterizations of Indian civil process, and risk
profiles that emphasized national origin and culture without sufficient
safeguards to avoid bias.
Amici offer the following arguments in order to assist the Court in
resolving the issues raised in this appeal:
(1) great care must be taken to avoid bias, as well as the appearance of
bias, when testimony and other evidence relies on national origin
and culture, especially when the potential repercussions of the case
are placed within the context of discrimination against Asian
immigrants, including immigrants from South Asia, in the history
ofWashington and the United States;
(2) courts should not decide cases based on generalizations about
foreign legal proceedings absent a strong factual basis about those
legal proceedings;
(3) courts should exercise caution in qualifying and relying on experts
who testify with regard to profiles that are based on national origin
and culture;
(4) undue reliance on India being a non-signatory to the Hague
Convention and inaccurate characterizations of Indian civil
process, when combined with improper reliance on stereotypes
based on national origin and culture, creates a near per se rule
against parents of Indian ancestry in child custody matters; and
(5) courts should be sensitive to what constitutes the best interests of
children in bicultural/multicultural families and recognize the harm
inflicted through severely limiting exposure of children to family
in other countries through strict restrictions on international travel.
Because a court's consideration of national origin and culture can lead to
bias as well as the appearance of bias, we request this Court to provide
firm guidance to lower courts regarding the role of national origin and
4

culture in family law proceedings, as well as standards for the use of
expert opinion that links traits related to national origin and culture to the
substantive issues in any given case. Although Mr. Katare is presented by
his attorneys as being highly assimilated, we urge the Court not to rely on
this aspect because an individual's level of assimilation might then
become overly determinative of parental rights. We believe this Court's
guidance on these matters is crucial to safeguard the interests of members
of immigrant communities and to permit them to enjoy all the rights and
responsibilities attendant to full membership in our society.
III.

ARGUMENT

This case involves undue reliance on national origin and culture in
a child custody setting. The case has great implications for the rights of
ethnic minorities and immigrants to enjoy fully their parental rights, as
well as the rights of children in bicultural and multicultural families whose
best interests require meaningful contact with their cultural roots.
A.

Great care must be taken when national origin
and culture are part of the basis for a court's
decision, especially given the historical treatment
of Asian immigrants in Washington and the
United States.

It is the official policy of this state that "[t ]he right to be free from

discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin . . . is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right." Washington Law Against
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Discrimination, RCW 49.60.030(1). Recognizing that bias and prejudice
have no place in the courtroom, the Conference of Chief Justices and
Conference of State Court Administrators issued a joint resolution in
which the Conferences "urge judges and court administrators ... [t]o be
vigilant of the various ways in which bias can manifest itself in the justice
system." In Support of State Courts' Responsibility to Promote Bias Free
Behavior, Joint Resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices and
Conference of State Court Administrators, Aug. 3, 2005, available at
http://www. consortiumonline.net/Resolutions/CCJRes_No 12_ 8-3-05. pdf.
The need to be vigilant with regard to biases in the justice system
is well illustrated by the historical treatment of Asian immigrants,
including immigrants from South Asia, in the Territory and State of
Washington, as well as in this nation. Immigrants from Asia constituted
the largest non-White group that settled in the Territory and State of
Washington. Immigrants from India were initially recruited to work in
Washington's timber industry, but their presence quickly engendered
animosity. One extreme act of violence took place in 1907 when "a band
of white workers raided a lumber camp in northern Washington and
chased several hundred [Asian] Indian workers across the Canadian
border." Bill Ong Ring, Making and Remaking Asian America Through
Immigration Policy, 1850-1990, at 72 (1993). Several outbreaks of
6

violence left only a few South Asians remaining in Washington. Id.
Broader anti-Asian sentiment led to restrictions that severely
limited opportunities for Asian immigrants to become full members of our
society. See, e.g., Const. art II, § 33 (1889) (restricting property rights of
aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens); United
States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215, 43 S. Ct. 338, 67 L. Ed. 616 (1923)
(holding that

an

Indian

immigrant

was

racially ineligible

for

naturalization); Wash. Laws, 1921, Ch. 50, §§ 1-11, Wash. Rev. Stat. §§
10581-92 (Remington 1932) (limiting land ownership and long-term
leases of agricultural land for aliens ineligible for citizenship); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923) (upholding
Washington's Alien Land Law); Lubetich v. Pollock, 6 F.2d 237, 238
(W.D. Wash. 1925) (quoting and upholding Section 4, chapter 90, Laws
1923, which prevented Asian immigrants from taking "for sale or profit
any salmon or other food or shellfish in any of the rivers or waters of this
state"); In re Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234, 236-38, 70 P. 482 (1902) (holding
that a Japanese immigrant would not be granted a license to practice law
because of his "Japanese race"). These restrictions were based on notions
of foreignness that operated to prevent Asian immigrants from becoming
full members of our society.
Sixty-eight years ago, in a case painfully familiar to Amici, a
7

young student at the University of Washington, Gordon Hirabayashi, was
arrested in Seattle, Washington, for violating a curfew and an exclusion
order imposed against Japanese Americans, orders that ultimately led to
their incarceration in desolate camps across the Western interior. The
curfew and the later exclusion of Japanese Americans were based on the
assumption that certain "racial characteristics" of Japanese Americans
supported the conclusion that they were prone to commit acts of espionage
and sabotage. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct.
1375, 96-99, 63 L. Ed. 2d 1774 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 217, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1944) (adopting the
reasoning in the Hirabayashi case to uphold the constitutionality of orders
excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast). The Supreme Court,
in upholding Mr. Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the curfew orders,
cited the close relationship that Japanese Americans maintained with their
communities and culture. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96-98. The Court
concluded that "[v ]iewing these data in all their aspects, Congress and the
Executive could reasonably have concluded that these conditions have
encouraged the continued attachment of members of this group to Japan
and Japanese institutions." Id. at 98. The Court, thus, cited evidence of
strong ethnic ties to support the conclusion that Japanese Americans
would be disloyal.

8

Just as Japanese Americans were suspected of espionage or
sabotage based on their ethnic ties, Mr. Katare has been adjudged a
potential abductor based, in large part, on the fact that he is from India and
maintains ties with his culture and family. The courts should be very
hesitant to consider evidence of cultural ties as proof of propensity to
commit a crime or to violate a court's order.

B.

Courts should not decide cases based on
generalizations about foreign legal proceedings
absent a strong factual basis about those legal
proceedings.

The trial court's 2009 finding that "Exhibit 25, p. 113, shows that
proceedings in India do not include summary proceedings," CP 156, while
factually accurate about what Exhibit 25 states, is an inaccurate
description of Indian civil process. This finding of fact, though citing to
the exhibit, basically echoes the conclusions of Ms. Katare's expert, Mr.
Berry. He stated that, from his knowledge of Indian law, it is not possible
to obtain relief on summary proceedings in Indian courts. IX RP, p. 20. 1
However, Exhibit 25, upon which he relied, actually explains that
India's Constitution allows the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to
return an abducted child to his country of residence, a procedure that
allows the petitioner "to take advantage of the relative speed and superior
1

We use the convention adopted by Appellant and Respondent and refer to the four
volumes of the transcript from the second remand hearing as VIII RP: Jan. 14, 2009 #1;
IX RP: Jan.14, 2009 #2; X RP: Jan. 15,2009 #1; and XI RP: Jan. 15,2009 #2.

9

authority of the High Court." Ex. 25, p. 111. Exhibit 25 later inaccurately
states that summary proceedings are not available, even though this is
directly contradicted by the case excerpt it relies on for this proposition.
Ms. Katare's expert, Mr. Berry, made notations on Exhibit 25. He
underlined the point about courts taking into account the paramount
importance of the welfare of the child but did not underline the
immediately following clause: "unless the court thinks it fit to exercise
summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is
for its welfare." Ex. 25, p. 113.
The meaning of this clause becomes clear when the case is read in
full. In the paragraphs immediately preceding the one excerpted in Exhibit
25, the Supreme Court of India makes clear that an initial determination
must be made as to whether to "conduct (a) a summary inquiry or (b) an
elaborate inquiry on the question of custody." See Dhanwanti Joshi v.
Madhav

Unde

(1998)

sec

1

112

(available

at

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp, follow "Citation" hyperlink
and enter Journal "SCC"; Year "1998"; Volume "1"; and Page "112").
Under a summary inquiry, "the court would return custody to the country
from which the child was removed unless such return could be shown to
be harmful to the child"; and under an elaborate inquiry, "the court could
go into the merits as to where the permanent welfare lay and ignore the
10

order of the foreign court or treat the fact of removal of the child from
another country as only one of the circumstances." Id. It is important to
remember that the Supreme Court of India in Dhanwanti Joshi based its
decision to conduct an elaborate inquiry on the specific facts in that case
where the abduction took place twelve years before the proceedings and
the child had lived in India for twelve years. Id. The court decided that the
question of return to the United States required the more elaborate factual
inquiry to ascertain what would be in the best interests of the child. Id. The
Supreme Court of India noted that courts in the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and the United States all use this same approach when dealing
with countries that are not signatories to the Hague Convention. Id.
In a recently decided case before the Supreme Court of India, when
faced with the question of whether to engage in a summary or elaborate
inquiry, the court chose the summary inquiry and ordered the child
returned to the United States consistent with the principle of comity and in
recognition of the joint custody order granted by the New York State
Supreme Court. See Chandran v. Union of India & Ors., WP(CRL) No.
112/2007 (Supreme Court of India Nov. 17, 2009) (available at
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp, follow "Date of Judgment"
hyperlink; then search 17 Nov. 2009). It is worth noting that the
authorities located the mother (abductor) and child (abductee) on October
11

24, 2009, and that this judgment ordering the return of the child to the
United States was issued on Nov. 17, 2009. Id.
A careful reading of Exhibit 25 and the case upon which it relied
reveals the correct characterization of Indian civil process, which is
confirmed by the 2009 Chandran decision. We note that understanding
Indian civil process in these matters can be confusing. 2 We urge that
courts take great care when characterizing court processes with which they
may not have direct familiarity.

It is extremely important to avoid

unwarranted generalizations that support stereotypes about the alleged
backwardness or lawlessness of other legal systems.
C.

Courts should exercise caution in qualifying and
relying on experts who testify with regard to
profiles that are based on national origin and
culture.

Ms. Katare offered Mr. Berry to give his opinion as to whether the
court should continue to impose restrictions on Brajesh Katare and his
travel with his children. IX RP, p. 53. Though purported to testify as an
expert in child abduction, IX RP, p. 12, 14, Mr. Berry went far beyond
predicting the risk of abduction in this case, treading dangerously into
issues of Indian law and culture.

In this Section, we begin with his

2

We note that an authority with regard to international child abduction in India contains
inconsistencies in its own text. See Anil Malhotra and Ranjit Malhotra, India, InterCountry Parental Child Removal and the Law, in The International Survey of Family
Law: 2008 Edition 144, 156 (Bill Atkin ed. 2008) (stating that summary jurisdiction is
not the only route courts may take, but later stating "that Indian courts would not exercise
summary jurisdiction"). They have yet to comment on the recent Chandran decision.
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testimony on Indian law and conditions in India before discussing the
most dangerous aspects of his testimony concerning "red flags" and
"profiles" based largely on national origin and cultural ties. Courts should
exercise extreme caution in considering such expert opinion.
With regard to Indian law, it appears that he relied solely on what
he read in materials that we demonstrated in Part III.B., supra, to contain
partial and inaccurate statements. He went further to paint a picture of
India as a primitive, dangerous, and lawless country. He did all this
despite never having been to India. IX RP, p. 49. It can only be assumed
that he did this to support his concern that the consequences of abduction
were permanent and severe. X RP, p. 19. In his review of State
Department material, Ex. 32, he drew particular attention to terrorist
activity, X RP, p. 10; outbreaks of tuberculosis, X RP, p. 12; and the
dangers of travel by road, X RP, p. 12. As to this last point, he testified
about the danger of being attacked by a passerby if one were to hit a
pedestrian or cow, which he states would not happen in the United States.
X RP, p. 13. He explained that cars are driven fast and recklessly in India.
X RP, p. 13. He testified that he was sure that there was no DOT in India
like the one in the United States because we do not have the problems that
exist in India. X RP, p. 14. He said that he did not think that India has the
same constitution as exists in the United States, but acknowledged that he
13

did not know what the constitution was. X RP, p. 15. Later, he did state
something positive about India: "[I]t's common knowledge that India is a
bastion of opportunity for those that are in his field, in computer science.
They excel in that." X RP, p. 31. The testimony is replete with stereotypes,
generalizations, and baseless assumptions, all carrying with them the
danger that Mr. Katare would be viewed a danger to his children because
he was from this allegedly lawless, dangerous country.
Of even greater concern is Mr. Berry's opinion as to the
significance of Mr. Katare's ties to India and Indian culture, even though it
is clear from his testimony that he had no specific knowledge about Mr.
Katare's specific ties with India and his culture, outside of what he learned
from Ms. Katare. X RP, pp. 48-49. Mr. Berry opined on certain "factors"
and "red flags" that he believed heightened the risk that Brajesh Katare
might abduct his children. In his testimony, Mr. Berry relied on various
profiles of parents at risk for abducting their children. One of the high-risk
profiles describes "a parent who is a citizen of another country who ends a
mixed-cultural marriage." Ex. 28 ("Early Identification of Risk Factors for
Parental Abduction"); IX RP, pp. 83 et seq. Mr. Berry testified that this
profile applied to Mr. Katare. IX RP, pp. 84-85. Profiling an immigrant
parent in a mixed-culture marriage as presenting an increased risk of being
a child abductor necessarily reflects bias based on national origin. The
14

courts should be extremely hesitant to allow opinion that national origin,
in and of itself, raises the risk that a person will engage in unlawful
conduct.
Mr. Berry further commented on how Mr. Katare's Indian roots
increased his risk of being an abductor. For example, he stated that "the
cultural aspects of India are very important to Mr. Katare. And I'm not
sure that that's a bad thing, but it's an indicator. For example, in the
parenting plan, his brother had to come to over to pre-approve the
marriage." IX RP, p. 86. Further, "the family living abroad, certainly, his
family in India makes that a clear indicator." IX RP, p. 86; X RP, p. 26.
And, finally, Mr. Berry noted that, according to Ms. Katare, Mr. Katare's
primary social interactions in Washington are with people of Indian
'

culture who maintain an Indian lifestyle. X RP, pp. 48-49. The assertion
that Mr. Katare's connection to his culture and family and friends are "red
flags" indicating that he is at risk to abduct has frightening implications.
Under that reasoning, immigrants or children of immigrants who feel a
connection to their culture, retain family in their countries of origin, and
have friends who share their ethnic heritage would be at increased risk of
abducting their children.
So-called "expert" testimony regarding cultural characteristics and
conditions in another country is highly prejudicial and has no probative
15

value with regard to someone's past, present, or future conduct. The
testimony in this case (1) constructs a narrative about the alleged
lawlessness, danger, and backwardness of India and (2) seeks to associate
Mr. Katare as fitting into a "profile" based on national origin and cultural
ties to this allegedly lawless, dangerous, and backwards place. Such
testimony presents a danger of racial and ethnic stereotyping that is not a
proper basis for legal decision-making. ER 701 and 702 cannot be read to
allow such testimony.
D.

Undue reliance upon India not being a signatory
to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction and upon
inaccurate characterizations of the civil legal
process in India, when combined with improper
reliance on national origin and culture, creates a
near per se rule against parents of Indian
ancestry in child custody matters.

Though Mr. Katare is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has renounced
his Indian citizenship and has lived in the United States for nearly 20
years, or half his life, he remains of Indian national origin. Most of his
family, except for his children, reside in India. He takes pride in India. XI
RP, p.14. He entered into a mixed-culture marriage which ended. These
characteristics by themselves apparently place him into a high risk profile
for international child abduction. See Exhibits 26, 28, 30, 31, and 33 (all
of which basically repeat the same red flags and profiles). When this high
risk is coupled with the untoward consequences that arise from dealing
16

with a non-Hague Convention country that is characterized as having
inadequate legal procedures, the result is a strong presumption operating
against parents of Indian ancestry ending mixed-culture marriages in child
custody matters. Because countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East
are predominantly the countries that have not yet signed on to the Hague
Convention, the use of "red flags" and "profiles" based on national origin,
ethnicity, and culture may have a disproportionate impact on immigrants
from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The only way for immigrants
from these countries to avoid this disproportionate impact based on
national origin and cultural ties is to cut off their ties to their countries of
origin. It is also important to remember that this disproportionate impact
affects the children ofbicultural and multicultural marriages.

E.

Courts should be sensitive to the best interests of
children in biculturaJJmulticultural families and
recognize the harm inflicted through severely
limiting exposure of children to family in other
countries through strict restrictions on
international travel.

Courts are required to accord the child's best interests the highest
priority in establishing a permanent parenting plan. RCW 26.09.002. This
not only means ensuring the child's physical care and safety, but also
providing for his or her emotional stability, changing needs as the child
grows and matures, and to otherwise protect the best interests of the child.
RCW 26.09.184(a), (b), (c), and (g). Biracial children have an interest in
17

exposure to both sides of their cultural heritage. See, e.g., Fernando v.
Nieswandt, 87 Wn. App. 103, 105-06, 940 P.2d 1380 (1997) ("as a mixed
race child, [the daughter] needed to learn about her father's culture as well
as her mother's").
For most ABAW and VABAW members, meaningful contact with
their Asian cultures and families was an essential part of their childhoods.
These experiences helped t4em to form their personal identities and
enabled them to understand better themselves as Asians in American
society. Creating opportunities to have these experiences and to form these
relationships will be particularly important for the Katare children, who
must rely completely on one parent in developing their connection to their
Indian heritage.
Travel with parents to

~he

lands where the parents were born is an

integral part of the development of many Asian Americans. The travel
restrictions imposed by the trial court essentially guarantee that the Katare
children will not have meaningful contact with Indian culture and their
Indian family, at least not until they are adults. By that time, their Indian
heritage may be as foreign to them as it is to their mother and her family.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The State has come a long way since Ward v. Ward, 36 Wn.2d
143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950), when the Washington Supreme Court held that
18

the children of a white mother and a Black father were "colored" and
would "have a much better opportunity to take their rightful place in
society if ... brought up among their own people." Id. at 755-56. The U.S.
Supreme Court put a stop to this kind of thinking in Palmore v. Sidotti,
466 U.S. 429, 433-34, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1984) (although
"a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a
variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with
parents of the same racial or ethnic origin," under the Equal Protection
Clause, private biases are "impermissible considerations" in custody
disputes). Here, the trial court's order with regard to the travel restrictions,
based strongly on improper considerations of national origin and culture as
well as on inaccurate characterizations of Indian civil process, would, if
allowed to stand, be a step backwards. We urge this Court to overturn the
trial court's order regarding the travel restrictions and to provide
appropriate guidance to safeguard against bias in cases such as this.
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